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I. THE ARCHITECT IN AN INCREASINGLY LITIGIOUS INDUSTRY
In recent years, architects and other design professionals
have become the targets of claims arising from problems en-
countered in construction projects. In addition to incurring the
costs of defending such claims, these design professionals (or
their insurers) have often found themselves absorbing the liabil-
ity for many "errors and omissions" that are difficult to defend
when individually excerpted from a substantial project. This
treatment of claims for defective design reflects a distortion of
the architect's professional standard of care that is justified
neither by the contractual liability assumed by the architect nor
by the economic balance among the parties involved in a con-
struction project.
A. The Architect's Function
The laborers who built the great cathedrals did so under the
direction of a master builder who applied his knowledge, craft
and experience to serve the practical and aesthetic require-
ments of the building's commissioning authority. The freema-
sons served as both designers and contractors, and, subject to
their patron's influence, they controlled the construction pro-
cess. They "carried in their heads a stock, not so much of pat-
terns as of ideas, that grew by experience as they went from
* Principal, Wright, Robinson, McCammon, Osthimer & Tatum, Richmond, Vir-
ginia. Mr. Wright's commercial practice emphasizes design professional liability issues.
** Associate, Wright, Robinson, McCammon, Osthimer & Tatum, Richmond, Vir-
ginia. Mr. Boelzner engages in a general commercial and government contract prac-
tice.
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one site to the next."1 This accumulated experience and skill
"seemed to others to be as much a mystery as a tradition, a
secret fund of knowledge. 2
During the Renaissance Era, architects like Brunelleschi and
Palladio began to divide their predecessors' task into design and
construction, with the architect assuming responsibility solely
for the former.' Concurrently, science took on an increased
importance in design.4 For the modern architect spawned by
the Renaissance, the "problem is no longer to design a structure
from the materials, but to design the materials for a struc-
ture."5 Through the first half of the twentieth century, an ar-
chitect supplied only the basic design features, while the con-
tractor erected the detailed structure based upon commonly
understood principles. Since the 1960s, however, owners' expec-
tations have increased with regard to the level of detail in the
plans and specifications prepared by architects. It is probably
no accident that this change has occurred over the same period
as a significant increase in construction litigation.
A modern architect's relationship with a project's owner is
defined by the contract between them, which may include as
broad or as narrow a scope of work for the architect as deter-
mined by the parties. While the architect's legal liability is
affected by policies embodied in tort law, such liability origi-
nates in, and is circumscribed by, the obligations assumed
through contract. An architect will be required under the law to
perform his duties without negligence, but the owner cannot,
through tort claims, impose duties upon the architect which the
architect did not assume in his contract.6 Nevertheless, even
within the realm of contract law, the trend has been toward
1. J. BRONOWSKI, THE ASCENT OF MAN 110 (1973). "They also carried with them
a kit of light tools. They marked out with compasses the oval shapes for the vaults
and the circles for the rose windows. They defined their intersections with calipers, to
line them up and fit them into repeatable patterns." Id.
2. Id. at 112.
3. Dana Cuff, The Architecture Profession, in THE ARCHITECT'S HANDBOOK OF
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE [hereinafter AIA HANDBOOK] § 1.2, at 5 (1988).
4. Id.
5. BRONOWSKI, supra note 1, at 110.
6. Moundsview Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 621 v. Buetow & Assocs., 253 N.W.2d 836,
839 (Minn. 1977).
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taxing the design professional with increasing responsibility for
problems encountered with projects.
The architect's usual functions occur in four phases: (1) de-
sign; (2) design development; (3) construction documents prepa-
ration; and (4) general administration.' The design phase in-
cludes the initial discussion of the plan and the scope of the
relationship with the owner, research of the site and of applica-
ble government requirements, approximation of the project time
and cost, and preparation of schematic design studies. Design
development follows the owner's approval of the initial plan,
and involves restudying the design, preparing the drawings and
outline specifications, recommending the construction materials
and equipment, and revising the estimate of costs. The con-
struction documents phase involves developing the preliminary
drawings into working drawings that provide essential technical
information, coordinating all drawings and specifications for the
various trades, preparing the technical specifications and .bid-
ding documents, and obtaining the necessary agency approvals.
The general administration of the project includes assisting
with the selection of contractors, checking the shop drawings,
preparing the necessary supplements to drawings or specifica-
tions, observing the work to procure construction consistent
with the contract documents, issuing change orders, checking
contractors' applications for payment, and other functions ac-
cording to the parties' agreement.'
Liability can arise from any or all of these phases of perfor-
mance. This article focuses chiefly on the activities related to
design proper, rather than construction administration by archi-
tects, although the standard of performance is equally applica-
ble to both.
7. Vernon L. Goodin, Architectural Malpractice Litigation, in 19 AM. JUR. TRIALS
231, 248 (1972).
8. Id. at 248-50. For a more detailed list of possible services, arranged in nine
categories but occurring in roughly the same phases of the project, see David
Haviland, The Building Enterprise, in AIA HANDBOOK § 1.1, at 10-11 (1988).
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B. The Increasingly Litigious Environment
Claims against design professionals are on the increase.
Between 1960 and 1981, the number of claims increased four-
fold.9 A recent survey by the American Consulting Engineers
Council indicated that a large majority of firms believes that
the threat of lawsuits hampers innovative technology. 10 In a
thoughtful 1989 presentation to the ABA's Forum on the Con-
struction Industry, John McGuinn suggested several reasons for
this trend, which has continued throughout the 1980s to the
present."
First, today's owners are different from those of the past.
Projects are highly leveraged and dependent upon cash flow,
which motivates owners to transfer to others-chiefly the design
professional or the construction contractor-the cost of financing
the "unexpected events" that are inevitable in construction.
Similarly, project-financing, for which lenders have recourse
only to project revenues and not to the owner's investors, also
begets attempts to impose unanticipated costs on others.'
Government owners, under the "waste, fraud and abuse" canon,
are pressed to control costs, and they consequently seek to
impose more costs on the designers and contractors." Senior
managers, whose backgrounds are often in law or finance rath-
er than in construction, lack full appreciation of the process and
its vagaries. At the same time, however, they insist upon great-
er involvement in the project with the stated aim of reducing
delays and inefficiencies. 4 Increased capital costs and the fast-
er pace of technological change (which shortens the competitive
lead time for an owner to get his or her product into the
market) push owners to attempt to compress construction time.
9. J. MILLER, ARCHITECT/ENGINEER LIABILITY: A GROWTH PERIOD 1 (1984) (citing
an NSPE survey).
10. ENGINEERING NEWS-REcORD, Feb. 20, 1995, at 7.
11. See J.F. McGuinn, Address at the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Forum on the
Construction Industry (May 11-12, 1989) (transcript on file with the University of
Richmond Law Review).
12. Id. at 11-13.
13. Id. at 12.
14. Id. at 14-16.
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Meanwhile, the construction process has become more
complex.'
Besides the changes in owners, other circumstances have
contributed to the increased contentiousness of construction. As
more parties seek to protect their interests, more participants
have become involved in the process; thus, consultants,
construction managers, lawyers, accountants, inspectors, and
even lenders and their experts play a role." The number of
subcontractors and suppliers on a project has also increased
dramatically.' This multiplicity of parties has led to a
fragmentation of responsibility and defensiveness. 8 Increased
competition in the construction industry from abroad has eroded
already thin profit margins and pushed participants to fight
over every dollar. Finally, expanding tort liability for econom-
ic damages and third party injuries has increased the cost of
construction."
For some of the same reasons, contractors have a financial
incentive to discover errors, omissions and conflicts in the con-
tract documents. In a tight competition to win the contract, the
contractor who prunes from his bid most of the flexibility to
absorb contingent costs will naturally seek to justify upward
adjustments in his compensation by identifying mistakes or
ambiguities in the design materials warranted to him by the
owner. This process results in shifting some of the unexpected
costs from the contractor back to the owner, who in turn seeks
to shift it to the architect.
Despite this trend, architects have generally continued to
establish their fees based on the costs of providing services and
not on the economic value of those services to clients or on the
level of risk assumed by the architect.2' Typically, the
architect's fee will constitute a relatively small part of the total
15. Id. at 17-19. McGuinn cites increased government regulation and oversight in
environmental and safety areas as contributing to higher capital costs. Id. at 19.
16. Id. at 19-20.
17. Id. at 20-21.
18. Id. at 21-23, 27-29.
19. Id. at 23-25.
20. Id. at 25-26.
21. AIA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 1.2, at 9.
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construction budget, somewhere between three and ten percent;
often, the more elaborate the project, the lower the percentage.
This incongruity between the architect's mode of compensa-
tion and the architect's potential liability threatens to disrupt
the economic balance among the parties involved in con-
struction projects. Inevitably, the result will include readjust-
ments in fees, in insurance protection, or in scope of work, in
order to regain the equilibrium necessary to sustain the enter-
prise. One natural defensive impulse, to narrow the scope of
work an architect undertakes, conflicts with an architect's de-
sire to perform additional and more specialized services." Both
tendencies are arguably driven by economic motives as archi-
tects strive to remain financially viable.
This article focuses on the legal liability standard to which
the work of architects is or should be held. It suggests that the
standard articulated by the courts is an entirely appropriate
one in view of the architect's role and compensation, but that
another standard often applies in the actual litigation of de-
fective design cases. Perhaps because lawyers have not suffi-
ciently addressed the issue, few courts have actually imposed
on owner-plaintiffs a burden of proof commensurate with the
standard of care that has been expressed in judicial opinions
for years.
II. THE STANDARD OF CARE
The formulation of the standard of care applicable in most
jurisdictions is generally traced to the case of Coombs v.
Beede,2" in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine said:
The undertaking of an architect implies that he possesses
skill and ability, including taste, sufficient to enable him to
perform the required services at least ordinarily and rea-
sonably well; and that he will exercise and apply, in the
given case, this skill and ability, his judgment and taste,
reasonably and without neglect. But the undertaking does
not imply or warrant a satisfactory result.24
22. See id. (noting both trends).
23. 36 A. 104 (Me. 1896).
24. Id. at 105.
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This basic standard, requiring reasonable care, skill and dili-
gence, is the rule in most jurisdictions.25
There appear to be only two jurisdictions, Alabama and
South Carolina, in which the courts hold an architect to an
implied warranty guaranteeing that his plans and specifications
are sufficient to make the structure reasonably fit for its in-
tended purpose.26 Many courts have explicitly stated that the
architect does not imply or guarantee a perfect plan, warrant
his plans and specifications, or guarantee a particular result.
A variation on the general approach employs the "workman-
like manner" standard more familiar in the contractor context.
25. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Akron v. Cann, 503 F.Supp. 419 (N.D. Ohio
1980), affd, 669 F.2d 415 (6th Cir. 1982); Swan Wooster Eng'g, 87-2 B.C_.A (CCH) 1
19,894 (1987); Clark v. City of Seward, 659 P.2d 1227 (Alaska 1983); Donnelly
Constr. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P.2d 1292 (Ariz. 1984); Palmer v. Brown,
273 P.2d 306 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Jim Arnott, Inc. v. L&E, Inc., 539 P.2d 1333
(Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Seiler v. Levitz, 367 A.2d 999 (Del. 1976); Audlane Lumber &
Builders Supply v. D.E. Britt Assoc., 168 So. 2d 333 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), cert.
denied, 173 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1965); Covil v. Robert & Co. Assoc., 144 S.E.2d 450 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1965); Board of Educ. v. Del Bianco & Assoc., 372 N.E.2d 953 (Ill. Ct. App.
1978); Lukowski v. Vecta Educ. Corp., 401 N.E.2d 781 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Pittman
Constr. Co. v. New Orleans, 178 So. 2d 312 (La. Ct. App. 1965), cert. denied, 179 So.
2d 274 (La. 1965); Borman's, Inc. v. Lake State Dev. Co., 230 N.W.2d 363 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1975); City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420 (Minn. 1978); State v.
Malvaney, 72 So. 2d 424 (Miss. 1954); Chubb Group of Ins. Cos. v. C.F. Murphy &
Assocs., 656 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Gathman-Matotan Architects &
Planners, Inc., 653 P.2d 166 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco
Assocs., 370 N.Y.S.2d 338, (Sup. Ct. 1975), affd, 385 N.Y.S.2d 613 (App. Div. 1976)
modified, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1977); Ressler v. Nielsen, 76 N.W.2d 157 (N.D. 1956);
Waggoner v. W&W Steel Co., 657 P.2d 147 (Okla. 1982); Scott v. Potomac Ins. Co.,
341 P.2d 1083 (Or. 1959); Bloomsburg Mills, Inc. v. Sordoni Constr. Co., 164 A.2d
201 (Pa. 1960); Capitol Hotel Co. v. Rittenberry, 41 S.W.2d 697, reh'g denied (Tex-
Civ. App. 1931); Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250 (Utah 1985); Surf
Realty Corp. v. Standing, 78 S.E.2d 901 (Va. 1953); McGuire v. United Bhd. of Car-
penters, 314 P.2d 439 (Wash. 1957).
26. See Federal Mogul Corp. v. Universal Constr. Co., 376 So. 2d 716 (Ala. Civ.
App.), appeal denied, 376 So. 2d 726 (Ala. 1979); Hill v. Polar Pantries, 64 S.E.2d
885 (S.C. 1951).
27. See, e.g., Gravely v. Providence Partnership, 549 F.2d 958, 959-60 (4th Cir.
1977); First National, 503 F. Supp. at 439; Seiler, 367 A.2d at 1007-08; Bay Shore
Dev. Co. v. Bondfoey, 78 So. 507, 510 (Fla. 1918); Audlane Lumber, 168 So. 2d at
335; Coombs, 36 A. at 105; Waggoner, 657 P.2d at 149; Nelson v. Commonwealth, 368
S.E.2d 239, 245 (Va. 1988) (architect does not guarantee infallibility); Surf Realty, 78
S.E.2d at 907; 5 AMi. JUR. 2D Architects § 23 (1962); 6 C.J.S. Architects § 27 (1975)
(citing applicable cases).
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In Board of Education v. Del Bianco & Associates, Inc.,28 the
Illinois Appellate Court held that an architect has a duty im-
plied in law "to specify the use of reasonably good materials, to
perform [his] work in a reasonably workmanlike manner, and
in such a way as reasonably to satisfy such requirements as
[he] had notice the work was required to meet."29
None of the various articulations of the architect's standard
of care is stated solely in terms of a level of skill. Without
exception, reference has also been made to exercising reason-
able diligence or reasonable care and applying one's skill with-
out neglect.30 This quantitative component of the standard of
care is highly significant in the context of professional practice
in construction because it indicates a distinction between the
skill or judgment employed on a given task and the thorough-
ness with which that skill or judgment is applied throughout
the project. The standard of care as articulated in virtually all
jurisdictions allows for something less than perfection, thus
requiring only reasonable skill and reasonable diligence. This
flexibility, however, is seldom recognized and applied in actual
adjudication of claims involving the quantitative component of
the standard. This is because the analysis of the two compo-
nents is not tailored to suit the nature of each component.
III. THE SKILL/JUDGMENT COMPONENT
It is not only possible but analytically compelling to consider
the skill component of the standard of care individually with
regard to each alleged design error in a defective design claim.
The inquiry is simply whether the skill manifested by the ar-
chitect as to each item was within the range of acceptable prac-
tice for the profession in the relevant area. One need only ex-
amine the particular misfeasance claimed, ask whether a rea-
sonably skilled architect would have done it this way or wheth-
er it is in fact a blunder, and assess liability accordingly.
As noted above, the skill standard does not exact perfection.
With respect to the skill component of the test the architect's
28. 372 N.E.2d 953 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
29. Id. at 958.
30. See supra note 25.
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standard of care may be compared to the standard of care ex-
pected of other practitioners in professions requiring judgment,
technique, calculation, and evaluation. For example, one court
has said that the "responsibility of an architect does not differ
from that of a lawyer or physician. When he possesses the
requisite skill and knowledge, and in the exercise thereof has
used his best judgment, he has done all the law requires."3'
Another court has observed that:
[t]he physician is not an insurer of health. He undertakes
only for the standard of skill possessed generally by others
practicing in his field, and for the care which they would
give in similar circumstances. He must have latitude for
play of reasonable judgment, and this includes room for not
too obvious or gross errors, according to the prevailing
practice of his craft.32
Therefore, the physician is not liable for damages if he fails to
cure his patient. Similarly, the lawyer is not liable for damages
if he fails to win his case.3
The same principle has been extended to the architect's prac-
tice. The Supreme Court of Minnesota stated in City of Mounds
View v. Walijarvi:
34
[D]octors cannot promise that every operation will be suc-
cessful; a lawyer can never be certain that a contract he
drafts is without latent ambiguity; and an architect cannot
be certain that a structural design will interact with natu-
ral forces as anticipated. Because of the inescapable possi-
bility of error which inheres in these services, the law has
traditionally required, not perfect results, but rather the
exercise of that skill and judgment which can be reasonably
expected from similarly situated professionals.35
In the same vein, the Indiana Court of Appeals has said that
"'[t]he architect is not a warrantor of his plans and specifica-
31. Lukowski v. Vecta Educ. Corp., 401 N.E.2d 781, 786 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)
(quoting Bayne v. Everham, 163 N.W. 1002, 1008 (Mich. 1917)).
32. Frank M. Dorsey & Sons, Inc. v. Frishman, 291 F. Supp. 794, 796 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (quoting Christie v. Callahan, 124 F.2d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1941)).
33. Id.
34. 263 N.W.2d 420 (Minn. 1978).
35. Id. at 424.
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tions. The result may show a mistake or defect, although he
may have exercised the reasonable skill required.' 35
Pursuant to this principle, the architect, like other profession-
als, is not held accountable for the ultimate result of his efforts
as long as his skill and judgment were commensurate with the
norms of his profession. Underlying such language in the cases
is not so much the notion of tolerating an acceptable level of
human error,37 but rather the idea that the professional must
reckon with factors beyond his control that will bear upon the
ultimate success of the enterprise. The Supreme Court of Min-
nesota in Walijarvi stated the following:
If every facet of structural design consisted of little more
than the mechanical application of immutable physical
principles, we could accept the rule of strict liability which
[plaintiff] proposes. But even in the present state of relative
technological enlightenment, the keenest engineering minds
can err in their most searching assessment of the natural
factors which determine whether structural components will
adequately serve their intended purpose. Until the random
element is eliminated in the application of architectural
sciences, we think it fairer that the purchaser of the
architect's services bear the risk of such unforeseeable diffi-
culties. 8
Similarly, another court has stated that "where the act to be
done is compounded of the skill of the agent and the operation
of causes over which he has no control, the law does not raise
from the fact of employment an implied undertaking to cure." 9
In all of these instances, whether design professionals or
physicians are involved, the practitioner is excused from perfec-
tion because of uncertainties and factors outside of his control
in the exercise of his craft. The inability of design professionals
to establish quality control procedures comparable, for example,
to those that can be developed by a manufacturer of thousands
36. Lukowski, 401 N.E.2d at 786 (quoting Bayne, 163 N.W. at 1008).
37. Cf. Hesler v. California Hosp. Co., 174 P. 654, 655 (Cal. 1918) ("the law takes
cognizance of human weakness and [the tendency] . . . to err . .
38. 263 N.W.2d at 424.
39. See, Note, Liability of Design Professionals-The Necessity of Fault, 58 IOWA
L. REV. 1221, 1234-35 n.73 (1973) (citing Bliss v. Long, Wright 351, 352 (Ohio Sup.
Ct. 1833)).
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of identical products is a compelling point frequently stressed in
arguments against imposing a standard of strict liability on
design professionals.4'
The central feature of analysis under the skill component
entails examining errors one by one and measuring them
against the standard of professional skill and judgment. The
skill component does not address issues of oversight or inatten-
tiveness to certain details. Instead, the inquiry focuses on an
untoward result in a matter under the professional's control,
and asks whether the professional displayed the requisite
knowledge of the state of his art and had sufficient experience
in the activity he attempted. Therefore, the analysis must nec-
essarily examine individual, separable acts and how each mea-
sures up under the prevailing skill level.4'
For any sort of alleged error other than one of skill or judg-
ment, however, the verdict under an item-by-item analysis will
be preordained. Any mistake that is an omission, as opposed to
a misjudgment, will by definition fall below the required level"
of skill, because that skill was not even applied to the particu-
lar item. Too often the analysis in architectural standard-of-care
cases ignores or disregards the other prong of the standard, the
quantitative or diligence component.4 As a result, perfection is
demanded sub silentio.
40. See Note, Liability of Design Professionals-The Necessity of Fault, 58 IOWA L.
REV. 1221, 1247-48 (1972-73).
41. The design professional, like the physician, should also be permitted some
errors of judgment if they are not "too obvious or gross," meaning that they are not
inconsistent with reasonable skill. Frank M. Dorsey & Sons, Inc. v. Frishman, 291 F.
Supp. 794, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Some case decisions contain language suggesting that
there is room for human error. See Hesler, 174 P. at 655; see also Allied Properties v.
John A. Blume & Assocs., Eng'rs, 102 Cal. Rptr. 259, 264 (1972) (citing Gagne, 275
P.2d at 21) ("Those who hire [professionals] are not justified in expecting infallibility,
but can expect only reasonable care and competence. They purchase service, not in-
surance.").
42. In Gagne, for example, errors of this sort made by an engineer were exam-
ined and found wanting under the skill component. 275 P.2d at 21.
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IV. THE QUANTITATIVE REASONABLENESS ELEMENT IN THE
ARCHITECT'S STANDARD
A. Other Professionals
As discussed, liability in the medical arena usually turns on
want of skill or proper judgment, rather than on insufficient
attention to particular details or lack of diligence. In other
words, medical cases often focus on malfeasance or misfeasance
rather than nonfeasance. A doctor usually will not assert, much
less prevail on, a defense that he simply did not focus on, over-
looked, or gave insufficient attention to the particular aspect
under examination. Doctors are expected to perform every act
required by the skill standard. Although patients may die not-
withstanding the best efforts of medical science, the physician
must bring the full force of that science to bear or be found
liable for failure to do so.'
There are several reasons why this approach is probably the
correct approach in medicine. One such reason has to do with
the degree of control exerted over a patient by a doctor. A
doctor's services are provided in an essentially linear manner
with regard to an individual patient. The practitioner makes a
series of evaluations, judgments and decisions regarding each
case. Although there are some random elements that affect
results, and other practitioners are involved, the treating phy-
sician is the captain of the ship who exercises as much control
as can be exercised over the patient's case. While the field of
medicine itself is complex and individual diagnoses may be
difficult, the doctor generally will not be precluded by economic
or other considerations from taking all the steps that reason-
able skill and experience dictate. If he does not do so, he will
be held accountable for any consequences.
The stakes involved in medicine, including the potential for
irretrievable loss, also dictate such an approach. The injury
43. See, e.g., Boyd. v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989). In Boyd, nurses
tending an expectant mother in the absence of a physician failed to monitor the fetus
sufficiently to interdict an asphyxiation problem. Id. at 1195. The attending
physician's order not to be disturbed until informed of complications or until the baby
crowned was held to have contravened "good medical practice." Id. at 1198.
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that can arise from medical error is of a higher order than the
monetary loss associated with business dealings. Doctors are
therefore expected to exercise virtually perfect diligence. 44
Doctors are also compensated for their diligence. Except in
rare cases, which usually involve cosmetic treatments, doctors
typically do not work under contracts with their patients. In-
stead, they perform everything that the prevailing level of skill
demands, on the (sometimes theoretical) assumption that they
will be paid for the services performed. Indeed, the increasing
invalidity of this assumption, due to managed care and other
types of formal or informal health care rationing, promises to
be an important element of the national health care debate.
Discussion of the standard of care for doctors thus omits any
consideration of an economic balance of risk assumed by con-
tracting parties." People do not voluntarily undertake medical
treatment in the same sense or to the same degree that they
obtain the services of a designer, or even those of a lawyer. In
the context of ordinary medical treatment, it is not surprising
to find that the consideration of who should bear the risk of
error is inapplicable.
With regard to the balance between responsibility and re-
quired diligence, the practice of law appears to be more similar
to that of architecture. Legal representation involves both skill
and diligence, but demands less rigor in the latter than re-
quired by medicine. In addition to being liable for doing the
wrong thing, lawyers are also liable for not doing what they
agreed to do.4" However, lawyers are not expected to do every-
44. These considerations parallel the risk benefit calculus under the admiralty
standard of negligence formulated by Learned Hand in the noted case of United
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). Under that standard, a
defendant is negligent if the burden (B) of taking precautions is less than the loss
(L) that a failure to take the precautions could reasonably be anticipated to cause,
discounted (multiplied) by the probability P that the loss will occur without the pre-
cautions being taken. So: B < PL. The magnitude of potential loss in medicine tends
to raise the product of P times L to a level requiring the exertion of all possible
effort. I& at 173. See also Brotherhood Shipping Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 985 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1993).
45. But see Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973), a case involving
plastic surgery that went awry, in which the court noted that an expectancy measure
of damages would seem harsh in view of the fee paid to the doctor as compared with
the potential expectancy recovery. Id. at 188.
46. See Young v. Jones, 256 S.E.2d 58 (Ga. 1979) (failure to ascertain and name
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thing that could have been done, only what reasonably should
have been done.4"
The nature of legal representation results in a bifurcated
standard. The lawyer controls his client's portion of the case or
transaction but must contend with sundry other influences,
many of them actively working against his client's interests.
The potential injury, however, is rarely as serious as the
client's life; more often, liberty or monetary interests are at
stake. The lawyer has a smaller share of the human control
over his case than the doctor does and can do less vital damage
if he fails to perform properly. There is logic in scrutinizing
both the skill exercised and the diligence shown in pursuing the
client's matter, and measuring both at some reasonable level
short of perfection.
B. The Architect's Practice
In any sizable project, it is possible, indeed inevitable, that
the architect will err without any volitional dereliction of
duty.' Modern construction is a terribly complicated enter-
prise. The division of function that began with Brunelleschi and
Palladio has multiplied almost exponentially, so that a major
project may now involve one or more prime contractors, and
hundreds of subcontractors, suppliers, planners, construction
managers, miscellaneous consultants, and government inspec-
tors. In fact, because so many people are involved in a major
project, the architect's fee as a proportion of the total project
cost is relatively small. His overall design is not necessarily
dependent solely or even chiefly on his best judgment. He not
only answers to the owner but also must contend with and
adapt to the schedules, capabilities, unexpected failures, chang-
es, advice and requirements of scores of other people, entities
and materials.
proper parties until statute of limitation had run); Cotton v. Travaline, 432 A.2d 122
(N.J. 1981) (failure to prosecute claim); George v. Caton, 600 P.2d 822, cert. denied
598 P.2d 215 (N.M. 1979) (ignorance of rules or statutes).
47. The lawyer "is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a rea-
sonable degree of care and skill, having reference to the character of business he un-
dertakes to do." 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys § 199 (1980).
48. See infra Part V.
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The number of details that must be considered in designing a
major structure has also proliferated. The modern architect has
a vast range of materials to choose from and a multitude of
systems to arrange so that they interact properly. His design
must conform to an ever-increasing variety of government and
industry regulations and standards.49 The architect's project
also does not proceed in linear chronology like the doctor's
treatment or the lawyer's case. The architect generally cannot
build the foundation in order to see what unexpected problems
might arise before designing the next system. All systems must
be planned in accordance with postulated conditions that will
likely change in some unforeseeable way."
The architect, then, has less control than the doctor or law-
yer has over a project, and the architect's project is at least as
complex as the "projects" of his fellow professionals. Moreover,
construction is fundamentally an economic undertaking. The
loss to the owner resulting from architectural malpractice is
almost wholly financial and remediable through economic
means.5' Perhaps in recognition of the less vital nature of the
interests affected by the architect in comparison to those en-
trusted to the doctor or lawyer, and the fact that monetary
injury is more easily compensable, the market has established
architects' fees as a proportion of total project cost, at a signifi-
cantly lower level than the other professionals' fees.
The thesis of this article is that the magnitude of the dispari-
ty between the architect's fee and the total project cost dictates
that the purchaser of the architect's services bear the risk that
unforeseeable difficulties will arise from the inherent uncertain-
ties of construction and that the architect's design will fall
short of perfection. In the context of an intricate project, errors
and omissions inevitably arise despite the architect's requisite
49. See Cuff, supra note 3, at 14-15.
50. Extremely complex structures like nuclear power plants, are designed seriatim
to a certain extent. Interferences arising from this process are dealt with by constant
redesign.
51. The word "almost" acknowledges that an owner can suffer aesthetic disillu-
sionment or considerable mental aggravation when construction projects go wrong.
The discussion here is confined to owners' damages; the third party liability of ar-
chitects for personal injuries caused by building failures is properly covered by tort
principles, except that an architect should not have to answer for areas of perfor-
mance assigned by contract to other parties.
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level of skill and the exercise of that skill,52 because the archi-
tect is not compensated for a level of attention to 'every design
detail sufficient to guarantee a perfect plan.
Theoretically the architect could be so compensated, but prob-
ably only theoretically. Building in accordance with plans and
specifications involves interpretation and judgment, no matter
how much detail is spelled out in the design documents, and is
therefore subject to divergent conclusions drawn from the same
information. In view of the financial incentives for owners and
contractors to find errors, omissions, and ambiguities in the
documents, as discussed above, it is unlikely that even perfect
documents would eradicate all claims.
Even if this theoretical perfection were achievable, economic
reality would not permit an allocation of significantly more cost
toward the design function. At some point, increased effort in
design development, review and coordination begins to yield
diminishing results in terms of reduced errors and omissions.
Left alone, the market will set the architect's fee at a level that
will pay for an amount of design detail acceptable to the owner
in view of the complications he knows to expect during con-
struction. Put another way, the owner will accept a level of
imperfection that results in a predictable and manageable range
of additional expense. This market-driven equilibrium, however,
presumes that the architect's fee adequately covers the costs of
his services and of his potential liability. If his liability is to be
expanded, the market will eventually have to take it into ac-
count.
52. See Lukowski v. Vecta Educ. Corp., 401 N.E.2d 781, 786 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)
(-The architect is not a warrantor of his plans and specifications. The result may
show a mistake or defect, although he may have exercised the reasonable skill re-
quired.") (quoting Bayne v. Everham, 163 N.W. 1002, 1008 (Mich. 1917)).
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C. Courts' Erroneous Treatment of the Standard
At least since the time of Coombs v. Beede,"3 courts have
held that the architect does not guarantee a particular result or
a perfect plan.54 Courts mean different things, however, when
they make these declarations. The Indiana Court of Appeals
has clearly said that the absence of a warranty of perfect plans
means that the plans may contain some defect or mistake and
nevertheless remain within the standard of care.55 The Minne-
sota Supreme Court, on the other hand, appears to construe the
Coombs principle to excuse only failures caused by unforesee-
able complications, not those caused by lack of attention to
routine functions.56 Too many courts take the approach of the
Delaware Supreme Court in Seiler v. Levitz,57 which acknowl-
edged that the standard of care did not require either "a perfect
plan or a satisfactory result,"8 but then upheld a finding of
liability based on individual errors the architect committed.59
The court relied solely on evidence bearing on skill and knowl-
edge as applied to each defective item without considering the
magnitude of the total errors in view of the architect's overall
performance on the project."0
In Swan Wooster Engineering,6' a Board of Contract Appeals
explicitly articulated the analysis many other courts apply with-
out discussion.62 Stating the basic standard of care exactly as
it has been embraced by the majority of jurisdictions, the board
said that the degree of ordinary and reasonable care, skill and
diligence is as it would be expected from an average member of
53. 36 A- 104 (Me. 1896).
54. Compare, e.g., Coombs, 36 A. at 105, (architect does not warrant "a satisfac-
tory result") with Lukowski, 401 N.E.2d at 781 (architect does not guarantee "a per-
fect plan").
55. Lukowski, 401 N.E.2d at 786.
56. See City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420, 424-25 (Minn. 1978).
57. 367 A.2d 999 (Del. 1976).
58. Id. at 1007-08 (quoting Bloomsburg Mills, Inc. v. Sordoni Constr. Co., 164
A.2d 201, 203 (Pa. 1960)).
59. I& at 1008.
60. Id. at 1008-10.
61. 87-2 B.CA (CCH) 19,894 (1987).
62. Id. at 100,638.
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the profession.63 Then, in the same paragraph, the board re-
jected testimony on the degree of the designer's error measured
as a percentage of the total cost, observing that "the Board is
not considering Appellant's overall professional competence,
rather we are considering allegations of individual design defi-
ciencies."'
The board clearly ignored the quantitative component of the
standard of care and considered the allegations of design defi-
ciencies item by item. The architect's overall professional com-
petence on the particular project is exactly what the board
should have considered if the diligence language in the stan-
dard is not surplusage; that is, if the standard of care requires
not perfection but rather ordinary and reasonable care and
diligence.
The board's reasoning leaves no room for errors of oversight
or lack of thoroughness; instead the board examines in hind-
sight each defect alleged and measures it against the normal
professional level of skill.6" The first claim in Swan Wooster is
typical. The Board said that "there is no dispute that the man-
holes were designed as 48" diameter when in fact 72" diameter
was required. On this basis we conclude that Appellant's design
of the manholes was negligent."66 Under this approach, each
error in the architect's work on a project can constitute negli-
gence. If it causes delay, reconstruction or other expenses, the
architect will be liable. This is the very level of perfection that,
according to the usual articulation of the standard of care, an
architect is not expected to meet.
Perhaps Swan Wooster was influenced by the strict compli-
ance doctrine pervasive in government contracting, 7 although
the doctrine generally does not apply in construction con-
tracts.68 The item-by-item approach to assessment of liability,
however, is not unusual in the courts. One legal expert in this
area has observed that "standard of care testimony usually
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 100,638-43.
66. Id. at 100,638.
67. See, eg., Robert McMullan & Son, Inc., 77-1 B.C.A. (CCH) S 12,453 (1977).
68. See, e.g., Fidelity Constr. Co., 77-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 9 12,831 (1977).
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focuses on a few specific actions or inactions-a detail or a
calculation buried in reams of competent work. Rarely can one
have the trier of fact consider the defendant's conduct on the
project as a whole."69 Approached in this way, a "competently
executed project [will] inevitably have pockets of malprac-
tice."70 A claim against a design professional will focus exclu-
sively on these pockets, and if the court proceeds item by item,
the result will almost inevitably be a finding of liability.
Perhaps a court confronted with an item of clear, measurable
damage that is unquestionably attributable to an architect's
mistake is loathe to withhold relief, regardless of the number of
design elements properly handled by the architect. This item-
ized analysis is inconsistent, however, with the standard of care
articulated by the same courts that determine liability by item-
ization. Moreover, it is inconsistent with the economic balance
and risk. allocation determined in the marketplace.
V. THE INDUSTRY ACKNOWLEDGES THE INEVITABILITY OF
ERRORS
Designs prepared by architects are unique products. Unlike a
manufactured item, a design cannot be pre-tested.
The design is a one-time-only result of many years of
schooling, apprenticeship, and service, fashioned to meet the
needs of a unique owner and a unique site. No amount of
effort, care, and conscientiousness on the architect's part
can foresee all the results of transforming a two-dimension-
al design into the multi-planed environment.'
69. Howard N. Ashcraft, Standard of Care in Professional Negligence Actions,
CONSTRUCTION BRIEFINGS (Hanson, Bridgett, Marcus, Vlahos & Rudy., Cal.), June
1993, at 1.
70. Id. Ashcraft also observes that juries tend to interpret a focus on the stan-
dard of care in an architect's defense as a tacit admission that an error was made;
therefore if the defendant cannot convince the jury that the standard was met, he
will have predisposed the jury to find liability. Id. Juries may be forgiven this infer-
ence, since courts fall prey to it as well, rejecting the possibility that an error may
not have constituted negligence.
71. Why Not Warrant? ISSUE: SPECIAL ISSUE OF THE NEWSLETTER OF THE AM. INS.
OF ARCHITECTS (Am. Inst. of Architects), Dec. 1986, at 6, reprinted in AIA Handbook,
supra note 3, § 2.2, at 8.
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Imperfections occur even in manufactured products that are
subject to theoretically foolproof inspection procedures. In com-
parison,
[a] construction project is a very different thing. It is built
only once, and from a specially prepared design that con-
tains thousands of elements. It is not unusual to find doz-
ens of subcontractors employed on a project at the same
time, performing different operations at different places....
In view of all the circumstances, it may be taken as axi-
omatic that some imperfections always occur in any sub-
stantial project.72
Some industry groups, design professionals and owners have
formally recognized this fact of construction life and have thus
developed contract provisions to address it. The American Con-
sulting Engineers Council (ACEC) has been able to convince
some owners that a proper standard of design performance can
be established for a given project that is dependent upon the
complexity of the undertaking and the resulting expected range
of error.73 Based on this range, a contingency fund is estab-
lished by contract to cover the extra costs arising from inevita-
ble problems during construction. Claims against the designer
are precluded to the extent they fall within the range of the
established contingency, which may vary from one-half to ten
percent of the project cost. The ACEC contract clause has the
following preamble: "The owner and engineer acknowledge that
in a project of this magnitude and complexity, changes may be
required as the result of possible omissions, ambiguities, or
inconsistencies in the plans and specifications which may or
may not be the fault of either of the parties hereto."74
Some governmental and private owners do not formally recog-
nize this principle, but they do so tacitly by forbearing to pur-
sue claims that flow from a level of error consistent with the
owners' experience with similar projects.75 These decisions are
72. JAMES ACRET, ARCHITECTS AND ENGINEERS 271 (3d ed. 1993).
73. Arnold L. Windman, Firms Use New Approach to Errors and Omissions
Claims During Construction, ACEC Bus. PRAc. NEWS, Feb. 15, 1985, at 1.
74. Id.
75. The authors are aware of some owners that observe informal guidelines based
on experience over many projects.
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probably based on considerations of litigation cost versus long-
term benefit, particularly in the case of government owners.
There is little incentive, however, for more widespread recogni-
tion of this principle as long as courts are willing to allow own-
ers to single out "pockets of malpractice" and recover damages
that in some cases may exceed the designer's entire fee.76
VI. TnE PROPER APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD OF CARE
Some courts have shown signs of recognizing that reasonable
diligence is not perfect diligence, and hence does not result in
perfect plans. They perceive that an architect may exercise
reasonable diligence and yet produce plans containing errors.7
The Supreme Court of Arizona has expressly made this analysis
in Chaney Building Co. v. City of Tucson.78 Other courts have
used language suggestive of such an approach or applied paral-
lel concepts.79
A. Chaney
In Chaney, the owner (City of Tucson) terminated the con-
tractor (Chaney) because of construction delays on a fire station
project.8" Chaney sued the City for breach of contract and also
joined the architect, alleging negligence in the preparation of
the plans. Chaney claimed that the architect's plans were defec-
tive and caused the delays. Shortly before trial the parties
stipulated to the architect's dismissal with prejudice.8
At trial, Chaney sought to introduce evidence of the defective
plans, to which the City objected, arguing that the dismissal of
the architect operated as an adjudication of the negligence
action and established as res judicata the fact that there was
76. See, e.g., Willner v. Woodward, 109 S.E.2d 132 (1959) (claim of $1,000 exceed-
ed total fee of $985).
77. A reasonable analogy might be drawn to the tennis commentators' concept of
an "unforced error" in a tennis match.
78. 716 P. 2d 28 (Ariz. 1986).
79. See infra part VI. B.
80. 716 P. 2d at 29.
81. Id.
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no negligence in the preparation of the plans.82 The trial court
overruled the objection and permitted the evidence.83 The Su-
preme Court of Arizona upheld this ruling.8'
The supreme court relied partly on the principle that a party
to a consent judgment, as compared with a court decision, is
not collaterally estopped from litigating an issue unless he
expressly agrees that the matter is deemed conclusively estab-
lished.85 But the court went on to observe, in regard to the
architect's standard of care:
In [an earlier case],86 we recognized that design profession-
als, such as architects, have a duty to use ordinary skill,
care and diligence in rendering their professional services
and must use their skill, care and diligence to provide suffi-
cient and adequate plans. An architect's work can be inac-
curate or imperfect without being an actionable deviation
from the standards of care observed by design professionals.
From a review of the record, we believe Chaney was enti-
tled to produce evidence and did produce evidence which
showed the delays in its performance could have been
caused by the plans and not by Chaney without [the archi-
tect] necessarily being negligent as a result.87
Here, in this unusual procedural context, is explicit judicial
acknowledgement that an architect may err or omit something
in the plans or specifications, thereby causing identifiable dam-
age, and yet still have met the standard of care.
B. Analogous Approaches
Other courts have ventured in this direction. In a case decid-
ed before Walijarvi,88 the Minnesota Supreme Court opened
the possibility of measuring the architect's responsibility accord-
ing to the scope of his work (and fee) in comparison to the total
82. Id.
83. Id. at 30.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Donnely Constr. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gileland, 677 P.2d 1292 (Ariz. 1984).
87. 716 P. 2d at 31 (citations omitted).
88. 263 N.W.2d 420 (Minn. 1978).
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project. In City of Eveleth v. Ruble,89 the court listed the fol-
lowing circumstances to be considered in determining the stan-
dard of care, skill and diligence required of a design profession-
al: "the terms of the employment agreement, the nature of the
problem which the supplier of the service represented himself
as being competent to solve, and the effect reasonably to be
anticipated from the proposed remedies upon the balance of the
system.""0 The nature of the problem might well encompass
the complexity of a huge project or the peculiar difficulties of a
renovation. The terms of the employment agreement would
encompass the professional's fee and the scope of work under
his control. Under these criteria, read broadly, the architect's
duty of skill and of diligence would properly be determined in
light of the scope of the project undertaken, and not solely by a
facile inquiry whether a reasonable architect would have made
this or that particular error, considered in the abstract.
In the case of Sard v. Berman,9 the New York Supreme
Court also appears to have recognized,. at least implicitly, some
relation between the liability of the architect for defects and the
magnitude of those defects in relation to the entire project. The
court said that "the alleged defects appear inconsequential espe-
cially when viewed in the light of what the plaintiffs paid for
the construction, what they received in the prior action and
what the property was then sold for."92 Although the case
turned on construction defects, which implicated the architect's
contract-administration duties, rather than on design defects,
the main idea was present, that the extent of the defects must
be measured against the overall scope of the project. 3
Apart from the Arizona Supreme Court in Chaney,94 the Col-
orado courts may have come closest to recognizing that a cer-
tain quantum of error is to be expected on any project, and that
the magnitude of the error should be considered in view of the
overall size of the project. In Kellogg v. Pizza Oven, Inc.9" the
89. 225 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. 1974).
90. Id. at 524-25.
91. 367 N.Y.S.2d 266 (App. Div. 1975).
92. Id. at 267.
93. Id.
94. 716 P.2d 28 (Ariz. 1986).
95. 402 P.2d 633 (Colo. 1965).
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architect's cost estimate for the project covered only about two-
thirds of what the final cost turned out to be. 6 Evidence indi-
cated that a normal margin of error in cost estimating would
permit approximately a ten-percent variation.97 The court
therefore held that the damages to which plaintiffs were en-
titled should be the net of this ten-percent normal variation, as
well as any items caused by owner-initiated changes. 8
Relying on Kellogg, the Colorado Court of Appeals in Jim
Arnott, Inc. v. L&E, Inc.99 stated that an architect would be
liable for a faulty cost estimate resulting from a failure to in-
clude in the design all items necessary to construct the project
but only if the error was substantial.'00 The court measured
an $8,000 error against the $1.5 million contract price for the
building and found it to have been insubstantial.' °'
The court's opinion in Jim Arnott is not entirely consistent
with the thesis posited here, however. Apparently, absent any
design for water softeners in the architect's plans, water soften-
ers of inadequate size were first installed and later had to be
replaced with softeners of increased capacity.'0 ' The owner
sought recovery of the entire cost of installing both sets of wa-
ter softeners.' On the ground that the architect had negli-
gently failed to assist in the design of the softeners, the trial
court awarded as damages the cost to install the larger soften-
ers, and this award was upheld on appeal.' 4 Thus, although
the court of appeals found the design omission to have been
insubstantial and denied recovery of the entire cost, it sus-
tained the award of some damages for the error.' If the er-
ror was truly insubstantial as compared to the total project
scope, then it was within the standard of care and should have
created no liability.
96. Id. at 634.
97. Id. at 636.
98. Id.
99. 539 P.2d 1333 (Colo,. App. 1975).




104. Id. at 1339-40.
105. Id.
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In Allied Properties v. John A. Blume & Associates, Engi-
neers,' the California Court of Appeals applied economic con-
siderations in determining the proper party to absorb the risk
of error in construction plans.0 7 Relying on the rule that an
owner warrants the plans to his contractor, the owner argued
that an implied warranty should be imposed on the architect
who prepared the plans for the owner.' ° The court responded
that the rationale for the owner warranty rule
is that any additional costs caused by an error in the plans
and specifications can be more equitably borne by the own-
er who receives the benefits than by the contractor. This ra-
tionale cannot be readily transferred to a professional who
prepares plans for an owner and receives hourly compensa-
tion for his services.'09
This is sound reasoning. It first acknowledges that the owner
ultimately reaps the benefits of the project. It then suggests
that the architect's liability should be circumscribed by the
reasonable scope of his duties, which scope is reflected in his
fee in comparison to the cost of the project. The higher his fee
is in proportion, the greater is his responsibility to ensure the
project's conformance to the owner's intentions and expecta-
tions, but the greater also is his financial ability to devote more
time to details.
VII. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL
Unless the legal standard for liability takes into account the
economic balance struck by the parties in allocating duties and
compensation, the market will adjust to meet the legal reality.
The problem for architects in the courts today is that, while a
standard of care appropriate to their true role is articulated,
resolution of some cases permits complaining owners to recover
for errors that were made by a reasonably diligent architect
who, because he was reasonably diligent, complied with the
standard of care. Uncertainty arises when the law appears to
106. 102 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1972).
107. Id. at 264.
108. Id. at 265.
109. Id.
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promise one standard but often renders judgment according to
another.
Courts should conform their case analyses to the standard
they embrace, or vice versa. Earlier in this article, it was as-
serted that the market will establish architects' fees at a level
commensurate with the economic value of their services, consis-
tent with the expectations of owners regarding inevitable com-
plications."' But the market can efficiently account only for a
clear legal standard. As long as matters remain confused, dol-
lars will be unnecessarily spent on litigation, insurance or con-
tingent protection.
Here it is proposed that sound reasoning and economic reali-
ty compel the conclusion that the standard as stated is correct,
and that the architect should not be held to a standard of per-
fection, either as to his judgment on each detail of a project or
as to his diligence overall. Resolution of claims should rest on
proper application of this standard.
In practice, this principle would require an owner-plaintiff to
show not just that errors and omissions occurred, but that the
number and type of mistakes exceeded what would reasonably
have been anticipated on a project of similar size and scope.
Normally, expert testimony would be necessary to establish as
part of the plaintiff's prima facie case of negligence that the
expected range of errors had been exceeded. Damages recovered
in cases where the range has been exceeded would be reduced
by the amount attributable to those errors and omissions falling
within the acceptable range of non-negligent mistakes.
Unquestionably, this evaluation is more difficult than the
relatively straightforward calculation of error, causation and
injury employed in the item-by-item approach. It is no more
complex, however, than the determination usually made by
juries of whether a doctor did all that he reasonably should
have done and did it reasonably well. A jury merely must add a
level of analysis. After weighing expert testimony on the propri-
ety of the architect's judgment on particular technical questions
to ascertain the degree of error, the jury must then weigh fur-
ther expert testimony on the overall level of error that would
110. See supra text accompanying notes 18-22, 47-51.
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have been expected, the similarity vel non of projects dited for
comparison, the scope of work undertaken, and the size of the
architect's fee in relation to the project cost and the damages
claimed. This adjudicatory effort is necessary if the architect is
truly required to be reasonably skillful and reasonably diligent,
but not perfect.
A court cannot be expected to embrace an approach that is
not advocated by the lawyers appearing before it. Counsel must
recognize the economic logic of the owner-architect-contractor
equation and the proper balance of risk among the three par-
ties. They must present the court with the expert testimony
and other evidence necessary for the court to apply the correct
standard to the resolution of the dispute. The architect's lawyer
who tries to defend his client's performance item-by-item has
been drawn into battle in a canyon chosen by his adversary,
and he can expect to be decimated in the crossfire.
Perhaps most importantly, architects should attempt to edu-
cate owners about what standard of care they are purchasing.
Inserting a contractual limitation of liability,"' or a contin-
gency fund provision such as the one used by the American
Consulting Engineers Council, can focus attention on the issue
and result in the amendment of either the fee or the scope of
work to achieve an economically acceptable balance. Architects
may be reluctant to raise the prospect of error and ensuing
difficulties at the outset of a working relationship with their
owners, but the alternative is to relegate the problem to post-
project litigation and malpractice insurance. Hoping to buy the
problem off by paying tribute, in the form of judgments or in-
creasing insurance premiums, is like adding levees along the
Mississippi: it only forestalls the flood and may add to its ulti-
mate severity.
111. Some courts, based on individual states' laws, have taken a dim view of limi-
tations on liability of design professionals, either on the theory that they constitute
indemnification of negligence contrary to public policy or on the ground that the limi-
tation provision was not conspicuous enough to have alerted the owner. See Building
Design and Construction, Dec. 1993, at 25. Such measures are advocated here precise-
ly for the purpose of raising the risk allocation issue and resolving it with the owner
in advance.
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